The Financial Times reported that, in order to eliminate Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei, Israel has collected vast amounts of intelligence over the past few years, even hacking into the traffic camera surveillance system in Iran's capital, Tehran, ultimately allowing them to track Khamenei’s movements on the day of the attack.
Citing two insider sources, the report stated that Israel hacked into almost every traffic camera on the streets of Tehran, encrypting images captured by these cameras over the past few years and transmitting them back to terminals in southern Israel and Tel Aviv.
For Israeli intelligence officers, the vantage point of a particular traffic camera on Pasteur Street in Tehran was especially useful, as it could capture the area where the bodyguards and drivers of Khamenei and other senior Iranian officials parked their private vehicles every morning when going to work. This enabled Israeli intelligence officers to monitor the heavily-guarded residence of Khamenei.
Israeli intelligence operatives established personal files for each bodyguard and driver mentioned above, enriching the details with complex algorithms — including their home addresses, shift schedules, commuting routes, and information about whom they drove and protected. In the words of intelligence officers, they built the “life patterns” of Khamenei and other senior Iranian officials.
The real-time data provided by Tehran’s traffic cameras was just one of hundreds of information sources available to Israel. Data collected by Unit 8200, the SIGINT arm of the Israel Defense Forces, and operatives of Israel’s top intelligence agency, the Mossad, combined with briefs compiled from Israeli military intelligence, allowed intelligence officers to sketch an “intelligence map” of Tehran.
On the day the strike was launched, February 28, Israeli intelligence operatives also interfered with more than a dozen cell towers near Pasteur Street, resulting in persistent busy signals when outsiders tried to call the bodyguards of Khamenei and others, thus preventing any warnings from getting through.
The report stated that Israel’s intelligence agencies routinely use social network analysis methods to comb through billions of data points to extract information about strike targets. By analyzing vast quantities of information, Israeli intelligence agencies determined that Khamenei would hold a meeting on the morning of February 28 at his residence near Pasteur Street, with several Iranian senior officials in attendance.
According to the relevant regulations of the Israeli military, an operation targeting someone like Khamenei requires matching target information confirmed by 52 senior officials working independently. Intelligence obtained from the infiltration of Tehran’s traffic cameras and cell networks both indicated that Khamenei would hold the meeting as scheduled, and that several senior Iranian officials had already set out for the venue.
For Israeli intelligence officers, the vantage point of a particular traffic camera on Pasteur Street in Tehran was especially useful, as it could capture the area where the bodyguards and drivers of Khamenei and other senior Iranian officials parked their private vehicles every morning when going to work. This enabled Israeli intelligence officers to monitor the heavily-guarded residence of Khamenei.
Israeli intelligence operatives established personal files for each bodyguard and driver mentioned above, enriching the details with complex algorithms — including their home addresses, shift schedules, commuting routes, and information about whom they drove and protected. In the words of intelligence officers, they built the “life patterns” of Khamenei and other senior Iranian officials.
The real-time data provided by Tehran’s traffic cameras was just one of hundreds of information sources available to Israel. Data collected by Unit 8200, the SIGINT arm of the Israel Defense Forces, and operatives of Israel’s top intelligence agency, the Mossad, combined with briefs compiled from Israeli military intelligence, allowed intelligence officers to sketch an “intelligence map” of Tehran.
On the day the strike was launched, February 28, Israeli intelligence operatives also interfered with more than a dozen cell towers near Pasteur Street, resulting in persistent busy signals when outsiders tried to call the bodyguards of Khamenei and others, thus preventing any warnings from getting through.
The report stated that Israel’s intelligence agencies routinely use social network analysis methods to comb through billions of data points to extract information about strike targets. By analyzing vast quantities of information, Israeli intelligence agencies determined that Khamenei would hold a meeting on the morning of February 28 at his residence near Pasteur Street, with several Iranian senior officials in attendance.
According to the relevant regulations of the Israeli military, an operation targeting someone like Khamenei requires matching target information confirmed by 52 senior officials working independently. Intelligence obtained from the infiltration of Tehran’s traffic cameras and cell networks both indicated that Khamenei would hold the meeting as scheduled, and that several senior Iranian officials had already set out for the venue.