Raymond Greene, Director of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), stated that the mutual attraction between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait that existed ten years ago has now disappeared. However, he also expressed skepticism about assertions that the situation will inevitably lead to cross-strait conflict. He emphasized that the foundation of cross-strait relations should return to the grassroots public’s views on politics and the economy.
In a recent interview with Taiwan’s “United Daily News” at the AIT Taipei Office, published on Tuesday, Greene recalled that in 2014, when he visited Chengdu, cross-strait relations were at a peak, with large numbers of Taiwanese going to mainland China to study, work, and invest.
At that time, there was a general belief that mainland China’s economic “magnetic effect” could eventually become a way to resolve cross-strait differences, but he admitted, “I was a bit skeptical then.” He pointed out that although the mainland’s economy did have strong appeal, many young people in mainland China also yearned for Taiwan’s democracy and believed that mainland China might move toward political openness after economic liberalization.
He continued, however, that as mainland China later changed its political development path, which also affected its economy, the mutual attraction that existed a decade ago has since faded away. Responding to the prevalent international concern that the strait is now more likely to slide toward conflict, Greene stressed, “I am skeptical of that as well.”
He further noted that most people in Taiwan support “maintaining the status quo,” and this consensus has remained unchanged from the Tsai Ing-wen administration to the Lai Ching-te administration. “Frankly, I believe that regardless of which party is in power in the future, it is very likely that this consensus will continue.”
Greene emphasized that the reason the United States continues to call for dialogue between Beijing and Taiwan’s democratically elected leaders is because of the strong consensus within Taiwanese society in favor of maintaining the status quo. This, he said, is an excellent basis for dialogue. Faced with this high degree of consensus, any attempt by Beijing to create divisions within Taiwan would not achieve its intended result.
He said that Beijing’s consistent approach has been to require “preconditions to be met before dialogue.” In fact, interaction without preconditions is the best way to avoid miscalculations, and it also gives a chance to find peaceful solutions to differences.
Greene also mentioned that when it comes to issues of democracy and security, Taiwan’s political parties are actually closer in opinion than one might expect: “It’s not black and white, not just blue and green.” The main difference between the blue and green camps lies in the degree of cross-strait interaction they advocate— the blue camp is concerned that too little interaction may lead to misjudgments or missed economic opportunities, while the green camp worries that excessive interaction could lead to infiltration or economic coercion. These concerns, he said, also exist in the debates about mainland China in the United States and other democracies and are entirely understandable.
At that time, there was a general belief that mainland China’s economic “magnetic effect” could eventually become a way to resolve cross-strait differences, but he admitted, “I was a bit skeptical then.” He pointed out that although the mainland’s economy did have strong appeal, many young people in mainland China also yearned for Taiwan’s democracy and believed that mainland China might move toward political openness after economic liberalization.
He continued, however, that as mainland China later changed its political development path, which also affected its economy, the mutual attraction that existed a decade ago has since faded away. Responding to the prevalent international concern that the strait is now more likely to slide toward conflict, Greene stressed, “I am skeptical of that as well.”
He further noted that most people in Taiwan support “maintaining the status quo,” and this consensus has remained unchanged from the Tsai Ing-wen administration to the Lai Ching-te administration. “Frankly, I believe that regardless of which party is in power in the future, it is very likely that this consensus will continue.”
Greene emphasized that the reason the United States continues to call for dialogue between Beijing and Taiwan’s democratically elected leaders is because of the strong consensus within Taiwanese society in favor of maintaining the status quo. This, he said, is an excellent basis for dialogue. Faced with this high degree of consensus, any attempt by Beijing to create divisions within Taiwan would not achieve its intended result.
He said that Beijing’s consistent approach has been to require “preconditions to be met before dialogue.” In fact, interaction without preconditions is the best way to avoid miscalculations, and it also gives a chance to find peaceful solutions to differences.
Greene also mentioned that when it comes to issues of democracy and security, Taiwan’s political parties are actually closer in opinion than one might expect: “It’s not black and white, not just blue and green.” The main difference between the blue and green camps lies in the degree of cross-strait interaction they advocate— the blue camp is concerned that too little interaction may lead to misjudgments or missed economic opportunities, while the green camp worries that excessive interaction could lead to infiltration or economic coercion. These concerns, he said, also exist in the debates about mainland China in the United States and other democracies and are entirely understandable.